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The decision in Stecher should eliminate much of the delay and
frustration brought on by the confusion following Shingleton and Beta
Eta. Clearly, the solution reached will be welcomed by plaintiffs' counsel
for it eliminates the possibility of insurers capitalizing on the uncertainty
which previously existed. However, it is submitted that the combined
effects of Stecher and Thompson may remove a sense of equilibrium
between plaintiffs and insurers. In fact, it may well be that plaintiffs'
counsel will emerge with something of an upper hand, or, at least, a
better bargaining position. Whether this is desirable is still to be deter-
mined. Nevertheless, the principles of Stecher represent an approach
which recognizes realities rather than artificial legal distinctions. Such an
approach preserves the judicial system as a viable means for the settle-
ment of personal injury claims. Should the Stecher and Thompson de-
cisions result in a re-evaluation of this area of litigation, it is the author's
position that the principles explained in Stecher should prevail.
JEFFREY A. DEUTCH
TAXATION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY-WHEN
IS A FARM NOT A FARM?
Plaintiff, a forester for about fifty years, sought the preferential tax
treatment granted owners of agricultural property under Florida's com-
plex, confusing, and often overlapping ad valorem taxation statutes.'
When county taxing officials refused to designate the property as agricul-
tural land for tax purposes, plaintiff brought two actions in the circuit
court of Volusia County challenging the classification and assessments
for 1966 and 1967.2 The circuit court held that the lands were properly
classified non-agricultural for taxation purposes because plaintiff was
not conducting a "bona fide forestry operation" as contemplated by the
statute.' On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First District, relying
1. FLA. STAT. § 193.071(3) (1969) [formerly FLA. STAT. § 193.11(3) (1967)] provides:
All lands being used for agricultural purposes shall be assessed as agricultural lands
upon an acreage basis, regardless of the fact that any or all of said lands are
embraced in a plat of a subdivision or other real estate development. Provided,
agricultural purposes shall include only lands being used in bona fide farming, pasture,
grove or forestry operations by the lessee or owner, or some person in their
employ. (emphasis added).
FLA. STAT. § 193.461(3) (1969) [formerly FLA. STAT. § 193.201(3) (1967)] provides that
"[a]ll lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be zoned
agricultural."
2. Plaintiff purchased the 3,300 acre tract of woodland in Volusia County for $302.68 per
acre in December, 1965. Plaintiff contended that the proper assessed value of the land in
1966 was $56 an acre, the land's value for agricultural purposes.
3. FLA. STAT. § 193.071(3) (1969) was applicable to plaintiff's property. See note 1,
supra. In reaching this decision, the chancellor considered, inter alia, the fact that the plain-
tiff had made no improvements to the property suited to forestry work and had no forestry
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on its recent decision in Sapp v. Conrad,4 reversed, holding that planting
trees, cultivating the land, and otherwise improving the property are not
essential elements of a bona fide forestry operation.5 The district court of
appeal then combined Sapp v. Conrad, the instant case, and a third case
also involving forestry land6 and certified the matter to the Supreme Court
of Florida as a question of great public interest. 7 The supreme court held,
reversed and remanded: The lack of improvements and forestry manage-
ment and the great disparity between the land's recent purchase price and
its assessed value as agriculturally classified land supported the chancellor's
finding that the land was not being used for a bona fide agricultural
operation. Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1971).
In Greenwood, the supreme court listed ten criteria which a trial
court may properly consider in determining whether a forestry opera-
tion is considered bona fide.' Perhaps more important than the criteria,
however, are the following two concepts strongly emphasized by the
court: (1) that the agricultural enterprise must qualify as an "operation";
and (2) that the trial courts are granted wide latitude in determining
the question of whether property is entitled to an agricultural classifica-
tion. Before discussing these concepts, however, it is necessary to discuss
the background in which the case arose.
The court considered the certified question from the district court
of appeal in light of Florida Statutes section 193.071 (1969) and 193.461
(1969).1 Although section 193.071 was repealed in 19701 as being "re-
dundant, obsolete and unnecessary" in light of section 193.461, it was
management program. Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665, 669 (Fla. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as Greenwood].
4. 240 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
5. Oates v. Bailey, 241 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
6. St. Joe Paper Co. v. Mickler, 241 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
7. The question, as phrased by the Supreme Court was:
Precisely what criteria should be considered by a county taxing official in determin-
ing what constitutes a bona fide forestry operation entitling the land to an agricul-
tural classification for tax assessment purposes? (which would result in a lower tax).
Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1971).
8.
(1) the opinions of forestry or other appropriate experts;
(2) the Tax Assessor's applicable expert opinion and factual data;
(3) the affidavit and testimony of the landowner and his witnesses;
(4) the business or occupation of the landowner;
(5) the nature of the terrain;
(6) the density of the marketable timber (or other product) on the land;
(7) the past usage of the land;
(8) the economic merchantability of the agricultural product;
(9) reasonably attainable economic salability thereof within a reasonable future
time for the particular product (Trees do not mature and become so rapidly
salable as do chickens or cows) ; and
(10) the use or not of recognized care, cultivation, harvesting and like practices
applicable to the product involved, and any implemented plans therefor.
Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665, 668 (Fla. 1971).
9. Id. at 666-67.
10. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-243.
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applicable to the plaintiff's property since the contested assessments
were for tax years prior to the repeal of section 193.071."
The origins of these two statutes are rooted in Florida's unique
development during the booming 1920's when subdivisions were carved
out of rural areas in Dade County. These subdivisions were never de-
veloped, and by 1957 they had reverted to farming uses. 2 In order to
provide a preferential assessment for these lands, the legislature enacted
what is now Florida Statutes section 193.07 1,13 providing for valuation
based on actual use as farm land. When this statute was challenged, the
Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the preferential assessment ac-
corded by section 193.071 did not violate the Florida Constitution's
requirement of "just valuation."' 4 The court held that
if a legislative directive designed to secure a just valuation of
a particular class of taxable property is reasonable, not arbitrary
or unjustly discriminatory, and applicable alike to all similarly
situated, it should be upheld by the courts.'"
In 1959, the legislature passed a land classification statute which
likewise contained a preferential assessment provision for agricultural
property.' 6 The statute exists today as section 193.461, "the Green Belt
law, which would seem to encourage and aid agricultural use of lands in
an engulfing urban world. . . ,'" In enacting the statute, the legislature
noted with some alarm that urban areas with their necessarily higher
assessed valuations were encroaching on farmlands, and as a result,
farmers were being "taxed out of existence." 8 Thus, the legislature
passed the "Green Belt" law "to perpetuate ... continue and encourage
agricultural pursuits," of farmers, foresters, ranchers, and others simi-
larly situated.'9
The statute protects agricultural property from high taxes, not by
11. Oates v. Bailey, 241 So.2d 730-31 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Greenwood
v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1971).
12. Wershow, Recent Developments in Ad Valorem Taxation, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1967).
13. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-195.
14. Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1965), interpreting FLA. CO NST. art. 9,
§ 1 [18851.
15. Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So.2d 521, 523 (Fla. 1965). The court, however, was deeply
divided on the question of the act's constitutionality, as the four-three decision indicated. In
his dissent, Justice Drew concluded:
To recognize the power of the Legislature to grant exemptions from taxation to cer-
tain classes-and that's what it amounts to-will be to destroy the ad valorem taxing
system in this State and to place the burden of government on those who are not
fortunate enough to be brought within a favored class. The Legislature has no
power, under our Constitution, to exempt any property from taxation. If this is to
be changed, it should be done by amendment to the Constitution and not by edict
of this Court.
Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So.2d 521, 526 (Fla. 1965) (dissenting opinion).
16. Fla. Laws 1959, ch..59-226, predecessor to FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1969).
17. Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1971).
18. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-226.
19. Id.
CASES NOTED
lowering the millage rate, but by limiting the land's assessed valuation."0
Consequently, a farmer will pay lower property taxes than a neighboring
phosphate miner, even though both own property of the same size and
both are taxed at the same millage rate. In the instant case, the problem
facing the supreme court was one of statutory construction. To answer
the certified question presented to it by the district court of appeal, the
supreme court looked to key phrases in the statutes, initially considering
"the construction to be placed on the words 'bona fide' and 'operations,'
and then as each relates to the other concerning 'forestry.' 21
As the lower courts had done in the past, the Supreme Court of
Florida relied on dictionary definitions and construed "bona fide" to
mean "in good faith," "genuine," "without fraud or deceit." 2 In the
past, establishing the bona fides of an agricultural enterprise had been
the key in qualifying for an agricultural classification. Here, however,
the court went further and defined the word, "operation." The word was
interpreted as "being at work," "producing an effect," "acting," "bring-
ing about," "performing," "functioning," and "activity.)
23
In setting forth a definition of "operation," the court seemingly
added a new requirement to the statute, or at least enforced an heretofore
ignored requirement. No longer will it be sufficient to establish the bona
fides of the agricultural enterprises, now an enterprise must first qualify
as an agricultural "operation."
Conceivably, a claim for agricultural assessment under asser-
tion of a bona fide forestry operation could be "bona fide"
within the meaning set forth above, yet not meet any standards
sufficient to qualify it as an "operation."24
Previously, courts had stressed the "bona fides" requirement in
the statute with the unstated assumption that if the property were being
used in good faith for agriculture, it was being used in an agricultural
operation. For example, all 68 acres of a Key Biscayne coconut planta-
tion (located in a valuable, developing section of Dade County) were
required to be assessed as agricultural property, even though the agri-
cultural work "could have been accomplished just as well on five or ten
acres." 25 In that case, the bona fides requirement was fulfilled, and the
20. Once the land qualifies as property being used primarily for bona fide agricultural
purposes, the tax assessor must assess the land only on the basis of its value for agricultural
purposes. In other words, a dairy farm in a suburban setting theoretically would be as-
sessed on the basis of its value if sold to another dairy farmer, not its value if sold to a
housing contractor. See FLA. STAT. § 193.461(6)(d) (1969).
21. Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1971).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Matheson v. Elcook, 173 So.2d 164, 166 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), cert. denied, 184
So.2d 889 (Fla. 1966). Clearly, under the new "operation" guidelines, the Matheson rea-
soning would fail:
[I]t would be possible for a property owner to seek an agricultural assessment in
good faith on a thousand acre tract of land devoted to no specific commercial use,
1971]
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District Court of Appeal, Third District, did not question the presence
or lack of an "operation." Under the newly established formula in
Greenwood, however, a landowner apparently must first establish that
his land is an agricultural "operation"26 before his good faith can be
established:
[O]nce a "forestry operation" has been established we expect
that it would be a rare situation where the claim for agricultural
assessment would not be "bona fide." For example, it is foresee-
able that a party, acting in good faith, could invest in unim-
proved land, knowing its potential as a merchantable timber
operation, utilize it as such, and yet anticipate increases in land
values as well as deductions afforded on income tax schedules
through depreciation and expenditures. The concern of the pro-
perty owner with these incidental objectives 27 would not dis-
qualify his land for consideration as a bona fide forestry opera-
tion.
28
but which had only a combined total of 50 acres of merchantable timber. Clearly,
the owner in such a case could not be said to be conducting a thousand acre forestry
operation, although he may have been acting with perfectly good faith.
Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1971).
26. The court, in construing the term "operation," necessarily discussed FLA. STAT.
§ 193.071(3) (1969) [repealed by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-243, § 49 (effective Jan. 1, 1971)],
which is no longer in force. See note 10 supra. FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1969), successor to FLA.
STAT. § 193.071(3) (1969), speaks in terms of lands used for agricultural "purposes." The
term is used no less than six times in the statute, while there is no reference to an agricultural
"operation." It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the court's discussion of
"operation" is inapplicable to the current statute. The basic thrust of the discussion is that
the land must be actively functioning as an agricultural enterprise. The concept does not
change when the word "operation" is replaced by "purposes," since one definition of operation
is "[a] course or series of acts to effect a certain purpose . .. ." FUNK & WAGNALLS ENCYCLO-
PEDIC COLLEGE DICTIONARY 946 (1968).
27. But if those incidental objectives become the primary ones in owning the land, the
property would not be used "primarily" for bona fide agricultural purposes, a requirement
under the statute. See FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1969). Such was the case where a corporate
landowner purchased property which it leased for cattle grazing, i.e., agricultural purposes,
but reserved an easement across the property for the discharge of fumes from its mining
operations.
[T]he legislature did not intend to give preferential tax treatment to land such as
that in the instant case that was obviously purchased for use in connection with the
company's phosphate operations and is still being used for that purpose, even though
it accomodates, also, an incidental use for agricultural purposes.
Walden v. Borden Co., 235 So.2d 300, 302 (Fla. 1970).
28. Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1971). In the court's hypothet, once an
"operation" is established, the speculative, non-agricultural aspect of land ownership does
not deprive an owner of the necessary good faith. The dicta is reminiscent of, though quite
nearly contrary to, a hypothet posed by the District Court of Appeal, First District, in 1965:
[O]ne of two abutting property owners, each having three thousand acres of
timberland, may conduct a bona fide timber program while the other primarily
utilizes his land as a game preserve with timber producing being incidental. A
visual examination of the property by the tax assessor would disclose a similar
utilization of the lands, but the bona fides of the utilization of each tract for agricul-
tural purposes would depend to some extent upon the subjective thinking of the
landowner. Or consider the obvious illustration of a speculative subdivision devel-
oper who places a few cows on urban land and calls it a ranch. Thus, it is the bona
fides of the utilization by the landowner that makes the land eligible for the benefits
of the statute, and the physical condition and appearance of the subject property
is not of itself controlling.
Stiles v. Brown, 177 So.2d 672, 676 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
CASES NOTED
Perhaps it was this theory-that a forestry operation is evidence of
a bona fide operation-which led to the conclusions in favor of the land-
owners in Greenwood's companion cases. In Conrad v. Sapp,29 it was
undisputed that the "lands were purchased many years ago by a land-
owner who was involved in large acreage devote[d] to forestry pur-
poses."'3 In other words, once the forestry operation was established, the
bona fides of that operation were more or less assumed.
Likewise, in St. Joe Paper Co. v. Mickler,81 there was no question as
to the fact of a forestry "operation." In fact, the county authorities had
granted the landowner agricultural classifications on the property in pre-
vious years." Only the bona fides had to be established, an easy require-
ment to fulfill under the new guidelines, which placed the primary empha-
sis on the question of "operation."
However, in Greenwood, the landowner-taxpayer sought the pref-
erential agricultural classification immediately upon purchase of the
property.3" Further, the evidence demonstrated that much of the timber
was worthless, and no forestry related improvements had been made-
both indicative of the lack of forestry "operation."34 Thus, given the
emphasis on "operation," the court's denial of the agricultural classifica-
tion is not surprising. In a sense, then, a new "operation" requirement has
been added to the statute, 5 and once that requirement has been fulfilled, a
favorable determination as to the bona fides of that operation is likely to
follow.
Besides the emphasis on agricultural "operation," Greenwood also
sets forth the principle that the question of bona fides is one of fact, which
is to be determined by the trial court and, therefore, rarely should it be
disturbed on appeal.
It is clear therefore that any determination of a bona fide forestry
operation must be arrived at upon consideration of all practices
and indicia existing in each case, and on a case by case basis. It
would be an impossible and unwise task for this Court, or any
appellate court, to attempt to establish inflexible, definite criteria
to be arbitrarily applied on a state-wide or even area basis. 6
In support of this principle, the court repeated the time-honored legal
maxim that a "judgment, order, decree, or ruling of a trial court comes to
the appellate court with a presumption of correctness .... 137 Since all of
these cases involve questions of fact, the duty of the appellate court should
29. 252 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
30. Sapp v. Conrad, 240 So.2d 884, 887 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), aff'd, 252 So.2d 225 (Fla.
1971).
31. 252 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
32. 241 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), aff'd, 252 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
33. Oates v. Bailey, 241 So.2d 730-31 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), aff'd sub nom., Greenwood
v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1971).
34. Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665, 669 (Fla. 1971).
35. FsA. STAT. § 193.461 (1969).
36. Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 663, 667-68 (Fla. 1971).
37. Id. at 669.
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be to consider only the legal sufficiency and competency of evidence, and
not its weight. Although the supreme court has spoken generally in these
terms in the past, 8 in Greenwood it appears to have placed an unusually
heavy emphasis on the limited role of appellate courts in reviewing these
questions of fact. The supreme court reminded the district courts that they
may not substitute their judgment for that of the trier of fact, nor re-try
the case."
In Greenwood, after finding that the "District Court substituted its
judgment for that of the chancellor whose judgment was supported by
competent, substantial evidence," the Supreme Court of Florida directed
the appellate court to reinstate the chancellor's finding.4
The message to the Florida appellate courts seems clear enough. How-
ever, the presumption of correctness afforded trial courts' factual de-
terminations is not absolute. In Conrad v. Sapp,4 a companion case to
Greenwood, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the district court of
appeal's reversal of the trial court judgment against a landowner. In
Conrad, county authorities had denied an agricultural classification to a
landowner because the property was located near developing areas and
would obviously have had a much higher value if converted to a non-
agricultural use. This evidence, i.e., evidence of a higher and better use
was held to be incompetent.
4 2
Likewise, in the other companion case, St. Joe Paper Co. v. Mickler,48
the supreme court reversed the decision of the district court of appeal
which had affirmed the trial court's denial of an agricultural classification.
There, a court ruled that the lack of scientific agricultural methods did not
preclude the existence of a bona fide forestry operation.44 Justice Dekle,
who wrote the opinion in Greenwood, dissented in Mickler. Relying on the
reasoning in Greenwood, Justice Dekle reiterated what nine days earlier
had formed the basis of the majority opinion:
[I]n cases of disputed facts the granting or denying of the bene-
ficial "agricultural" classification by the taxing authorities, and
any court review thereof, are to be based upon the particular
facts of each case under applicable standards (criteria); that the
determination arrives in this Court with a presumption of cor-
rectness (under this well-established rule); and that the decision
will be affirmed if supported by competent, substantial evi-
dence."
38. See Powell v. Kelly, 223 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1969).
39. Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665, 669 (Fla. 1971).
4o. Id.
41. 252 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
42. Perhaps the Conrad v. Sapp decision can be rationalized on the basis of this dicta
from Greenwood: "Of course, instances may arise where the facts are so clearly established
that the conclusion [of a bona fide agricultural operation] becomes one of law." Greenwood
v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1971).
43. 252 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
44. Id. See also Judge Wigginton's dissent in Sapp v. Conrad, 240 So.2d 884, 888 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1970).
45. St. Joe Paper Co. v. Mickler, 252 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
CASES NOTED
Obviously, the Supreme Court of Florida has attempted to clear the
confusion surrounding the determination of bona fide forestry operations
for the purposes of preferential tax treatment. The court's new reliance
on the "operation" requirement seems logically sound and easy enough to
apply. But the strong language indicating that the chancellor's finding
should seldom be disturbed on appeal seems somewhat paradoxical in light
of the companion decisions. In both Conrad v. Sapp46 and St. Joe Paper
Co. v. Mickler,47 the trial court decisions were ultimately reversed. It is
clear, therefore, that trial court determinations of factual questions are not
as secure on appeal as the language of the supreme court in Greenwood
seems to suggest.
PAUL J. LEVINE
INSIDER TRADING AND RULE 10b-5:
A NEW REMEDY*
In the landmark case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,1 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the use of "inside informa-
tion" to purchase stock in a corporation and the "tipping" of such in-
formation to third parties was a violation of section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 19342 and rule 10b-5 thereunder.' By
46. 252 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
47. 252 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
* In 1968, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided the landmark case of
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). While the court set forth
far-reaching principles of new law, many questions were left to be determined by the federal
district court on remand since only the question of liability had been presented to the Second
Circuit for review. Since the parties had stipulated that the question of possible remedies
would be litigated after a determination of liability, many matters were left untended
in the 1968 decision. This note is directed to the return visit of Texas Gulf Sulphur to the
Second Circuit. Judge Waterman, who wrote the first opinion, has also authored this
latest installment. The opinion is a rambling one which contains several sub-holdings within
its principal holding and is a decision which must be read in conjunction with its predeces-
sor. This note treats the primary and secondary holdings of this latest case and also places
the case within its historical perspective as adequately as possible within its limited length.
1. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 10(b)].
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commissioner may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as rule lob-5I.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
